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The Transformation Test: 
Artistic Expression, Fair Use, and the Derivative Right 
Frank Houston* 
“It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to 
the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of [art] 
. . . .”1 
– Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
 
The fair use doctrine is perhaps copyright law’s most malleable 
concept.  Defined as a privilege allowing the use of copyrighted ma-
terial, for limited purposes, without the copyright owner’s consent,2 
fair use stands for the proposition that copyright protection is not ab-
solute.  Copyright law’s purpose is twofold:  It protects the remunera-
tive interests of authors, and it cultivates a culture of learning and 
creativity.3  If its protections are too narrow, copyright’s incentives 
may be inadequate to motivate authors to create; if they are extended 
too broadly, copyright owners might chill discourse and cultural de-
velopment.4  Fair use straddles this divide.  The doctrine is a recogni-
tion that society is served by a free flow of ideas; copyright should not 
dam the river at its source, depriving those who seek to drink from its 
waters downstream.  Fair use requires courts to apply copyright law 
                                                                                                                           
 * Frank Houston is a 2011 graduate of the Florida International University College of 
Law and the former Editor-in-Chief of FIU Law Review.  He has a Master of Science in Journal-
ism from Columbia University and Bachelor of Arts in English from Emory University.  Frank 
would like to express gratitude to the following scholars for their feedback on this Comment:  
Professor Lawrence Lessig of Harvard Law School; Anthony Falzone, the Executive Director of 
the Fair Use Project and a Lecturer in Law at Stanford Law School; and Professor Rebecca 
Tushnet at the Georgetown University Law Center. 
 1 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). 
 2 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985) (quoting H. 
BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)). 
 3 Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1109 (1990).   
 4 Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 
285 (1996). 
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with flexibility when it threatens to squelch the very creativity it is 
supposed to nurture.5 
Fair use is an affirmative defense to copyright infringement that 
allows the reproduction, without permission, of copyrighted material 
for such purposes as commentary, criticism, and news-gathering.  
Though it had been part of the common law of copyright for centu-
ries, the doctrine was codified in the Copyright Act of 1976.6  The ob-
jective is to carve out certain “fair uses” that allow a secondary author 
to incorporate copyrighted elements of an original work — whether an 
excerpt or something new that derives from that original — that are 
technically infringing, but statutorily defensible.  In deciding whether 
such uses are “fair,” judges consider four statutory factors that look, 
essentially, to the nature of the borrowing and its economic impact on 
the author of the original.7  In applying the four factors, judges wield a 
tremendous amount of discretion.8   
A particularly difficult issue in fair use determinations is the con-
cept of “transformation,” the question to what extent a secondary 
work may draw on a copyrighted original because it goes on to “trans-
form” that original into something new.9  On the one hand, transfor-
mation lies at the heart of creative expression; on the other, it clashes 
with one of modern copyright law’s most expansive provisions: the 
copyright holder’s right to control derivative works.  As a result, 
courts sometimes struggle to distinguish between a fair use and a de-
rivative one.10  “The source of confusion is a distinction the law no 
longer cares to draw . . . between republishing someone else’s work 
[and] building upon or transforming that work.”11   
This Comment will explore the fair use doctrine, focusing specifi-
cally on the evolution of transformative fair use as it has been defined 
and interpreted in several key decisions related to artistic expression.  
In Part I, I sketch a brief history of copyright law, leading up to the 
1976 codification of both the fair use doctrine and the derivative right, 
two concepts that are frequently at odds.  I explore the challenges 
faced by judges charged with interpreting the statute, as well as those 
                                                                                                                           
 5 Campbell v. Acuff Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (quoting Stewart v. Ab-
end, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)). 
 6 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 
U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2006)). 
 7 17 U.S.C. § 107; see also Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use 
Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (2008). 
 8 See Leval, supra note 3, at 1126. 
 9 Id. at 1111. 
 10 LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE 
LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 19 (2004). 
 11 Id. 
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faced by secondary authors confronted with an expanding bundle of 
rights held by copyright holders.   
Part II investigates the major court decisions, from the district 
court level to the Supreme Court, that have defined and interpreted 
transformative fair use in the context of artistic expression.  I place 
special emphasis on Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,12 in which the Su-
preme Court first recognized and defined the scope of transformative 
use, and SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.,13 a recent and poten-
tially influential decision in which the Court of Appeals for the Ele-
venth Circuit vacated an injunction against the publisher of The Wind 
Done Gone,14 a parody of Margaret Mitchell’s Gone With the Wind.  
While inarguably derivative, The Wind Done Gone was found to have 
sufficiently transformed the original — as both parody and critique — to 
be a fair use of its key characters and concepts, and not merely a se-
quel.15  Importantly, in reaching its decision, the court also held that 
the First Amendment militated against injunctive relief, a first in fair 
use jurisprudence.  Because the Supreme Court has yet to define the 
contours of transformative fair use in a purely literary context, Sun-
Trust Bank has the potential to have a great impact on future fair use 
decisions. 
The decision has already been brought to bear in Salinger v. Colt-
ing,16 where the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York17 drew a line such a transformative use must transcend to be a 
valid fair use.  The suit centers on Sixty Years Later: Coming Through 
the Rye, an unauthorized sequel to J.D. Salinger’s Catcher in the Rye 
written by Frederik Colting; the district court enjoined the publication 
of Colting’s book last year.18  Simply put, the book just isn’t transfor-
mative enough.  Taken together, the two lower court cases suggest an 
emerging approach:  In the case of Wind, the court deemed the exer-
cise artistically worthwhile (although despite the lifting of the injunc-
tion, the case was still remanded to the district court to assess eco-
nomic harm and potential damages).19  In the case of Salinger, the 
court has read Rye-redux and found it wanting.  (During oral argu-
                                                                                                                           
 12 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 13 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 14 Id. at 1277. 
 15 Id. at 1271. 
 16 641 F. Supp. 2d 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 17 This marks the second time the Court has ruled in favor of Salinger in a copyright in-
fringement claim.  In Salinger v. Random House, 650 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), the reclusive 
author was granted an injunction against publication of a biography that quoted from his per-
sonal letters. 
 18 Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 254. 
 19 SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001). 
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ments, the court of appeals suggested it may agree with the lower 
court’s literary, if not legal, critique.20  Ultimately the court remanded 
the case, but did not disturb the lower court’s fair use finding.)21  The 
Salinger and SunTrust cases find courts navigating a course some-
where between judicial interpretation and outright literary criticism in 
an attempt to define transformative fair use in a derivative literary 
context.22  
Part III of the Comment considers a variety of prescriptions for 
overhauling — or, at the very least, refining — the fair use doctrine.  
These include narrowing or at least reinterpreting the derivative right, 
and curbing the use of preliminary injunctions in the interest of pro-
tecting expression.   
In Part IV, I urge the adoption of a doctrine of transformation.  I 
begin with an attempt to stitch together a workable definition of 
transformation from the case law.  From there I propose a compulsory 
statutory license as a means of easing and systematizing the imple-
mentation of transformative uses by mandating a fee for original crea-
tors, and I proceed to emphasize the important role a transformation 
doctrine can play in restoring balance to the First Amendment — legal 
monopoly continuum on which copyright law exists.  The Comment 
concludes with an exhortation of the importance of fair use reform in 
view of the seismic changes occurring as digital technologies trans-
form artistic expression. 
I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION AND FAIR USE 
The origins of modern copyright law stretch back 300 years, to 
the English Statute of Anne, passed by Parliament in 1710.23  The law 
created a statutory right in authors limited to fourteen years and re-
newable for an additional fourteen years.24  In the United States, cop-
yright statutes among the newly independent states were modeled on 
the British statute until the Constitution explicitly vested power in the 
                                                                                                                           
 20 “One of the judges, Guido Calabresi, elicited loud laughter from the gallery when he 
offered as an aside that 60 Years Later . . . ‘is a rather dismal piece of work if I may say so.’”  Ed 
Shanahan, Second Circuit Judge: Catcher-based Book “Rather Dismal Piece of Work”, THE AM 
LAW DAILY, Sept. 3, 2009, http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2009/09/ salinger-
appeal.html. 
 21 Salinger, 607 F.3d at 83. 
 22 Salinger, 607 F.3d 68; SunTrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1260. 
 23 Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 8 Anne, C.19 (1710), reprinted in 8 MELVILLE 
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 7-5 (1990). 
 24 The 1790 Act allowed renewal of a copyright for a second fourteen-year term if the 
author was alive at the expiration of the first fourteen-year term.  See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 
15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124. 
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federal government to create patents and copyrights.  Congress 
passed the first Copyright Act in 1790.25   
As recently as 1991, the Supreme Court clarified that “the sine 
qua non of copyright is originality. . . . Original, as the term is used in 
copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the 
author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses 
at least some minimal degree of creativity.”26  The writings worthy of 
protection, the Court said, are those that “are the fruits of intellectual 
labor.”27  Copyright “assures authors the right to their original expres-
sion, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and infor-
mation conveyed by a work.”28 
The original 1790 legislation granted authors protection for 
books, maps, and charts for fourteen years and allowed copyright re-
newal for a second fourteen-year term.29  There copyright law stood, 
for more than a century.  Subsequent revisions in 1909, 1976, and 1998 
significantly expanded copyright’s domain.30  Copyrightable subject 
matter grew to encompass music and dance, visual arts like painting 
and photography, movies, and computer programs.  To qualify for 
protection, a work need only exhibit a “modicum of creativity”31 and 
be fixed in a “tangible medium of expression.”32  The duration of cop-
yright has grown to encompass the lifetime of the author plus seventy 
years.  And most importantly, the bundle of rights associated with 
copyright protection now stretches well beyond mere copying, enfold-
ing rights of distribution, performance and display, and derivative 
works based on the original but in different forms or otherwise al-
tered. 
As the rights conferred by copyright have expanded, they have 
increasingly come into conflict with the Constitution’s overarching 
philosophy toward intellectual property, which is that copyright exists 
primarily in order not to reward authorship, but rather to “promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”33  While acknowledging that 
copyright bestows a kind of monopoly on authors, in 1984 Justice Ste-
                                                                                                                           
 25 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124-26. 
 26 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc, 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
 27 Id. at 346 (emphasis in original). 
 28 Id. at 349-50. 
 29 ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 384-86 (4th ed. 2007). 
 30 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 1(b), 35 Stat. 1075; Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2006)); Act of Oct. 27, 1998, 
Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-304). 
 31 Feist, 499 U.S. at 346 (citing The Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879)). 
 32 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
 33 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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vens reminded that the privilege is not “designed to provide a special 
private benefit . . . [but instead] is a means by which an important 
public purpose may be achieved.”34 
That purpose was recognized from the beginning of copyright.  
Not long after the Statute of Anne appeared, courts in England began 
recognizing that certain uses of copyrighted material would not in-
fringe the rights of authors.  The doctrine, first referred to as “fair 
abridgement,” later became known as “fair use.”   
A. Fair Use 
Behind the fair use doctrine is the idea that if copyright protec-
tion bestows the benefits of intellectual property rights on authors and 
artists in order to stimulate the resulting intellectual and cultural 
enrichment for all of society,35 these rights should be counterbalanced 
in the interest of the thinkers and creators who follow in their foot-
steps.  The idea dates back at least 200 years, to Lord Mansfield’s 
statement in Sayre v. Moore36: 
[W]e must take care to guard against two extremes equally pre-
judicial; the one, that men of ability, who have employed their 
time for the service of the community, may not be deprived of 
their just merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and labour; 
the other, that the world may not be deprived of improvements, 
nor the progress of the arts be retarded.37   
Without some level of copyright protection for authors, unfet-
tered competition from others who copy and distribute the work with 
impunity would greatly hinder the author’s and publisher’s ability to 
recover the costs of production.  The result would be a world in which 
only authors with few, if any, monetary concerns would bother creat-
ing, and publishers looking for return on their production, marketing, 
and distribution investments would be loathe to play their role in the 
process.38  On the other hand, to some extent, all creative work is in-
herently derivative of that which has come before, and in areas like 
philosophy, history, journalism, and criticism, secondary works are 
inherently referential.39  Fair use, then, allows for these secondary uses 
                                                                                                                           
 34 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). 
 35 See Leval, supra note 3, at 1109.  At the time he wrote this article, Leval was a United 
States District Court judge in the Southern District of New York.  Today he is a judge on the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 
 36 Cary v. Longman, (1801) 102 Eng. Rep. 138 (K.B) 140 n.b; 1 East 358, 362 n.b.  
 37 Id. at 140. 
 38 Netanel, supra note 4, at 292-93. 
 39 See generally Leval, supra note 3. 
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where they in some way further artistic or scientific progress,40 the 
ultimate, Constitutional goal of copyright law.  In other words, fair 
use “is a necessary part of the overall design.”41   
Fair use had been part of the common law for more than a cen-
tury when it was codified in the Copyright Act of 1976.42  The statute 
set out the doctrine as a four-part test, which traces its roots back to 
Folsom v. Marsh,43 an 1841 copyright infringement case involving a 
biographer of George Washington named Jared Sparks, whose The 
Writings of George Washington included the former president’s offi-
cial and private correspondence, addresses, messages, and other pa-
pers.  Nearly 400 of the book’s 866 pages were copied verbatim from 
Washington’s personal records.  The decision, written by Justice Sto-
ry, formed the eventual basis of the four factors to be considered 
when evaluating a secondary work’s infringing qualities:   
1) The purpose and character of the use, including whether such 
use is of commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational pur-
poses;  
2) The nature of the copyrighted work;  
3) The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation 
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and  
4) The effect of the use upon the potential market for, or value 
of, the copyrighted work.44   
In addition to acting as a kind of First Amendment counter-
weight to the monopolistic tendencies of copyright, another advantage 
of fair use is that its protections are designed to be broad.  Copy-
righted material has long been re-purposed in areas of research and 
commentary; recent decades have seen the doctrine expand to allow 
technological uses like videotaping, photocopying, software, reverse 
engineering, and search engineering.45  The flexibility of fair use 
makes it particularly adaptable to an era of rapid technological meta-
morphosis. 
                                                                                                                           
 40 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 41 Leval, supra note 3, at 1110. 
 42 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 
U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2006)). 
 43 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). 
 44 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 45 See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007); Sony Corp. 
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 
977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992), amended by 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 78 (9th Cir. Jan. 6, 1993); Field 
v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006). 
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For example, within a decade of its incorporation into the United 
States copyright statutes in 1976, fair use played a key role in legiti-
mizing the emergence of a new technology: video cassette recorders 
(VCRs).  In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,46 
Universal Studios and Walt Disney Productions brought a contributo-
ry infringement action against Sony and several retailers of its Beta-
max recorders on the premise that the new devices allowed others to 
infringe their copyrighted television programming.  Sony’s own survey 
showed that the primary consumer use of the VCR was “time-
shifting,” a nifty bit of jargon coined to describe the now ubiquitous 
practice “of recording a program to view it once at a later time, and 
thereafter erasing it.”47  Although some infringing uses of VCRs were 
acknowledged, the Supreme Court upheld the district court’s finding 
that even if there had been infringing home-use recording of copy-
righted material, the VCR could still be legally used to record non-
copyrighted material or material whose owners consented to the copy-
ing.48  An injunction, the Court held, would deprive the public of 
access to the VCR for such non-infringing uses.49  It was a resounding 
victory for fair use. 
B. The Challenges of Applying the Fair Use Doctrine 
While the objective of fair use is clear, its exact prescription in 
practice is less so.  Even as he groped his way to articulating what be-
came the basis for the fair use doctrine, Justice Story lamented the 
difficulties inherent in its application:  “Patents and copyrights ap-
proach, nearer than any other class of cases belonging to forensic dis-
cussions, to what may be called the metaphysics of the law, where the 
distinctions are, or at least may be, very subtile [sic] and refined, and, 
sometimes, almost evanescent.”50  He continued: 
[W]hat constitutes a fair and bona fide abridgment, in the sense 
of the law, is one of the most difficult points, under particular cir-
cumstances, which can well arise for judicial discussion. It is 
clear, that a mere selection, or different arrangement of parts of 
the original work, so as to bring the work into a smaller compass, 
will not be held to be such an abridgment. There must be real, 
substantial condensation of the materials, and intellectual labor 
and judgment bestowed thereon; and not merely the facile use of 
                                                                                                                           
 46 464 U.S. 417. 
 47 Id. at 423. 
 48 Id. at 456. 
 49 Id. at 454-56. 
 50 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). 
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the scissors; or extracts of the essential parts, constituting the 
chief value of the original work.51 
Just where the line is to be drawn between intellectual laboring 
and facile scissoring — cutting and pasting, in today’s parlance — con-
tinues to bedevil the courts. 
“What is most curious about this doctrine is that neither the deci-
sions that have applied it for nearly 300 years, nor its eventual statuto-
ry formulation, undertook to define or explain its contours.”52  Even 
the U.S. Copyright Office itself notes that the line between fair use 
and infringement can be fuzzy.53  Critics routinely bemoan the doc-
trine’s lack of precision and predictability.54  So do judges.55  “It is de 
rigeur to begin a scholarly discussion by quoting one of the judicial 
laments that fair use defies definition . . . before going on to define it 
anyway.  The field is littered with the corpses of overturned opi-
nions.”56  As common law, fair use was mercurial, but when Congress 
incorporated the doctrine into the Copyright laws, it did nothing to 
curb its expansive nature: 
Congress adopted three considerably inconsistent ways of doing 
nothing: simple reference to fair use, specification of what is fair 
use by illustrative examples, and prescription of nonexclusive 
“factors to be considered” in determining whether a particular 
use is fair.  As Hercule Poirot observed about the murder on the 
Orient Express, the problem is not that there are too few clues 
but that there are too many.57 
For example, while it was a landmark triumph for fair use, the 
Sony decision pointed up the difficulties judges would face in applying 
the statutory factors to their fair use deliberations.  Without guidance 
from Congress, it would be up to the judiciary, on a case-by-case basis, 
to decide which factors were the most important in deciding whether a 
use was defensible.  The Sony Court appeared to tilt the fair use ba-
lancing test toward the economic factors, seeming to create a pre-
sumption of harm where a purported fair use was commercial in na-
                                                                                                                           
 51 Id. at 345. 
 52 Leval, supra note 3, at 1105. 
 53 U.S. Copyright Office — Fair Use Factsheet, FL-102, available at http://www.copyright. 
gov/fls/fl102.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2009). 
 54 Symposium, Fair Use: “Incredibly Shrinking” or Extraordinarily Expanding?, 31 COLUM. 
J.L. & ARTS 571 (2008). 
 55 Judge Learned Hand characterized fair use as “the most troublesome in the whole law 
of copyright.”  Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939). 
 56 Lloyd Weinreb, Fair’s Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
1137 (1990). 
 57 Id. at 1139. 
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ture.  There, the Court had found that “time-shifting” for private use 
was noncommercial, but also noted in dicta that “every commercial 
use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of 
the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright” 
and that “if the intended use is for commercial gain, that likelihood 
[of economic harm] may be presumed.”58   
A year later, Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises,59 a case involv-
ing the political magazine The Nation’s unauthorized publication of 
verbatim quotations from a forthcoming memoir by former President 
Gerald Ford, officially elevated the fourth factor to preeminence in 
fair use deliberations.  The holding in Harper & Row characterized 
the “effect of the use” upon the potential market or value of the copy-
righted work as “undoubtedly the single most important element of 
fair use.”60   
As difficult as it may be for judges to apply the doctrine, writers 
and artists who seek to rely on fair use have the most to lose.  This is 
because creators may find it difficult to ascertain their rights to draw 
on existing works.61  Overly optimistic reliance by secondary users on 
a fair use defense frequently leads courts to issue injunctions against 
their attempts to publish.62   
In other cases, uncertainty about fair use — or even the fear of lit-
igation despite a good faith belief that the doctrine applies — leads 
some creators to decide it isn’t even worth the potential battle, espe-
cially against powerful media companies that zealously guard the 
gates to their content.  Lawrence Lessig describes an episode in which 
documentary filmmaker Jon Else, while filming opera stagehands 
playing checkers backstage, inadvertently captured four seconds of an 
episode of The Simpsons playing on a television in the background, a 
bit of color the filmmaker found fortuitous — at least until he was con-
fronted with the dilemma of either trying to obtain permission to use 
the copyrighted footage or claiming fair use.  The Simpsons creator 
Matt Groening approved, but directed Else to the Fox network, which 
sought $10,000 for the use of the clip.63  Despite widespread assur-
ances from the legal community that the footage amounted to fair use, 
Else told Lessig he was also informed that “Fox would ‘depose and 
                                                                                                                           
 58 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449, 451 (1984). 
 59 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
 60 Id. at 566. 
 61 William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 
1693-94 (1988). 
 62 See, e.g., SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001); Salin-
ger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010); Salinger 
v. Random House, 650 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y 1986), rev’d, 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 63 LESSIG, supra note 10, at 96. 
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litigate [me] to within an inch of [my] life’ regardless of the merits of 
my claim.”64  He cut the footage out of his film.  (Else may have bene-
fited from the later development of the Documentary Filmmakers’ 
Statement of Best Practices, in which the community asserts, preemp-
tively, certain uses of copyrighted material as fair: “quoting media in 
order to critique or analyze it; quoting media to make a point about 
the culture; incorporation of copyrighted works in the process of film-
ing something else; and quoting to make a historical point.”)65 
Some commentators find this especially problematic in an era of 
media consolidation, where content producers own enormous inven-
tories of existing content that they have either created or acquired, 
content they can endlessly recycle at low marginal costs, all while forc-
ing secondary authors to contemplate a perilous dilemma: invoking 
fair use, or pursuing a license at a prohibitively high cost facilitated, at 
least in part, by copyright protection itself.66   
C. The Derivative Right 
While commentary and criticism are expressly permitted by fair 
use as it was codified in 1976, the doctrine was put on a collision 
course with another of copyright law’s core protections: the derivative 
right.  The same legislation granted copyright owners exclusive rights 
to prepare derivative works based on their original creations, includ-
ing translations, arrangements, versions in other media, sequels, and 
“any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or 
adapted.”67   
This new right was a product of the Copyright Act of 1976,68 
wherein Congress expanded the growing bundle of rights to include 
that of adapting works in new media that had been added by the Cop-
yright Act of 1909.69  The derivative right can be traced back to 1870, 
when Congress responded to a Supreme Court decision that had 
upheld the right of a German author to translate Harriet Beecher 
Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin by explicitly adding the right of translation 
to the bundle of exclusive rights guaranteed to a copyright owner.70  
                                                                                                                           
 64 Id. at 95-98. 
 65 Rebecca Tushnet, User-Generated Discontent: Transformation in Progress, 31 COLUM. 
J.L. & ARTS 497, 498 (2008) (citing Pat Aufderheide & Peter Jaszi, Fair Use and Best Practices: 
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While the 1870 Act provided that “authors may reserve the right to 
dramatize or to translate their own works,”71 Congress went even fur-
ther in 1909, adding novelization and musicalization to the expanding 
list of derivative rights for copyright holders.72  
Daly v. Palmer,73 the first derivative rights case in the United 
States, marked a turning point in the dramatic expansion of copyright.  
The plaintiff claimed a copyright in his play, Under the Gaslight, and 
sued another playwright for infringing his “Railroad Scene,” de-
scribed by the New York court: 
[O]ne of the characters is represented as secured by another, and 
laid helpless upon the rails of a railroad track, in such manner, 
and with the presumed intent, that the railroad train, momentari-
ly expected, shall run him down and kill him, and, just at the 
moment when such a fate seems inevitable, another of the cha-
racters contrives to reach the intended victim, and to drag him 
from the track as the train rushes in and passes over the spot.74 
Though the scene has become, by now, abundantly familiar, at 
the time the court noted, “this incident and scene was entirely novel, 
and unlike any dramatic incident known to have been theretofore 
represented on any stage, or invented by any author before the plain-
tiff so composed, produced, and represented the same.”75  The court 
held that the defendant’s play, After Dark, infringed the Railroad 
Scene, issuing an injunction to prevent the defendant from publicly 
performing any version of the scene.76  The court held that it was “pi-
racy” if an original work “is recognized by the spectator . . . as convey-
ing substantially the same impressions to, and exciting the same emo-
tions in, the mind, in the same sequence or order.”77  Thus, an argua-
bly fair use could be considered infringing where underlying “impres-
sions” were discernable by an audience.  This recognition of the de-
rivative right, soon to be codified, marked copyright law’s turn away 
from encouraging progress in the arts, toward protecting the natural 
property rights of authors.78 
The justifications offered for the derivative right are the same 
economic arguments that underpin copyright itself: that an interest in 
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the reward that comes with derivative work serves as a necessary in-
centive for the production of such work.79  A secondary rationale is 
that the right to control the use of her creation, including any deriva-
tive use, is a matter of an author’s moral or natural rights. 
But the derivative right casts a heavy shadow over the defense to 
copyright infringement represented by fair use.  In reality, as it has 
been interpreted by judges, much of the derivative right is already 
encompassed in the expansive rights of reproduction, particularly in 
light of a Ninth Circuit decision in 1970 that construed the reproduc-
tion right to include works that did not literally copy but merely 
evoked the same “total concept and feel” as the original.80  Because an 
important element of the inquiry into infringement of both rights is 
the “substantial similarity” test, infringement of the derivative right 
almost automatically entails infringement of the reproduction right, 
because a derivative work inevitably borrows some aspect of the orig-
inal that will likely be independently copyrightable.81   
Considered in tandem, both rights represented a dramatic en-
largement of copyright protection beyond its roots, one that “would 
seem most bizarre to our framers, though it has become second nature 
to us.”82  Indeed, for the first century of copyright law, authors could 
freely borrow from existing works, provided they made significant 
contributions and didn’t usurp demand for the original work.83  The 
expansion of copyright into derivative uses represents a fundamental 
recharacterization:  What once was part of the public domain, in the 
form of ideas, is now considered protected, in the form of expression.84   
The Ninth Circuit embraced the broad derivative right in 1988.  
In Abend v. MCA,85 the holder of the copyright to It Had to be Mur-
der, the story upon which Alfred Hitchcock based his 1954 film Rear 
Window, sued over the re-release of the movie in theaters, on televi-
sion, and on videocassette.  MCA had acquired the original rights to 
produce the film for $10,000, but Abend claimed that the re-release 
interfered with his derivative rights to produce other works, including 
a proposed play for HBO.86  The Court of Appeals for the Second 
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Circuit denied MCA’s fair use claim and further stated that Abend 
was entitled to damages based on “[a]ny impairment of [his] ability to 
produce new derivative works” resulting from the film’s re-release.87  
The Rear Window case established the nearly boundless extent of a 
copyright holder’s derivative rights.   
Taken as a whole, these new and expanding rights create a gaunt-
let any potentially transformative fair use will have difficulty navigat-
ing.  It has been observed that Leonard Bernstein’s Broadway musical 
West Side Story may have infringed Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet 
were it protected by copyright today, and T.S. Eliot’s The Waste Land 
might have suffered a similar fate were its source material not spread 
across the centuries.88 
II.  TRANSFORMATION AS FAIR USE   
Beginning in the 1990s, courts began to grapple with tests of fair 
use that moved beyond technological (Sony) and journalistic (Harper 
& Row) invocations of the doctrine to cases involving artistic expres-
sion.  Where courts had once evaluated fair use largely in terms of 
market harm, requiring judges to think like economists, fair use de-
terminations involving potentially transformative uses now involved 
judges in the act of critical interpretation.  This put judges in precisely 
the position that Oliver Wendell Holmes had warned against in 1903: 
that “persons trained only to the law [might] constitute themselves 
final judges of the worth of [a work of art] . . . [denying copyright pro-
tection] to pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the 
judge.”89 
Over a series of cases, courts have been forced to define “trans-
formation” for the purposes of fair use analysis, as applied to the visu-
al arts, popular music, photography, and literature.  While circuit 
courts have weighed in on the former and the latter, the Supreme 
Court has yet to define the contours of transformative fair use in a 
purely literary context.  Transformative fair use decisions necessarily 
involve the court in an enterprise of criticism, evaluating the relative 
artistic merits of the works of secondary authors in an attempt to sep-
arate original works from free riding ones.  This role - court as critic - 
is unusual, but given the doctrine we have, inevitable. 
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A. Rogers v. Koons: Puppies and Parody  
In 1991, a professional photographer named Art Rogers brought 
a copyright infringement suit against visual artist Jeff Koons, who had 
used a photograph called “Puppies,” an image of a couple holding a 
litter of German Sheperd puppies, to create a sculpture called “String 
of Puppies,” part of an exhibition he called “The Banality Show.”  
Koons had seen the image on a note card, and viewed the picture as a 
part of the mass culture “resting in the collective sub-consciousness of 
people regardless of whether the card had actually ever been seen by 
such people.”90  Rogers’s photo became the basis for one of a series of 
puppy sculptures, which were displayed at New York City’s Sonna-
bend Gallery in 1988.  (The gallery was also named as a defendant in 
the suit.) 
Koons cited fair use.  The artist argued that his sculpture was a 
satire of society at large, a form of social criticism that drew upon the 
Cubist and Dada movements and artists like Marcel Duchamp, paro-
dying the mass production of commodities and media images by in-
corporating them into works of art.91   
The court began its fair use analysis where the Harper & Row 
court left off, having declared that the effect of the secondary use on 
the potential market of a copyrighted work was “undoubtedly the 
single most important element of fair use.”92  The Rogers court posited 
the first fair use factor, purpose and character of the use, as a question 
of “whether the original was copied in good faith to benefit the public 
or primarily for the commercial interests of the infringer. . . . Knowing 
exploitation of a copyrighted work for personal gain militates against 
a finding of fair use.”93 
This emphasis on public benefit was loading the deck.  Finding 
the nature and purpose of the use by Koons to be commercial, and 
even in bad faith, the court was still bound to explore the sculpture’s 
artistic claims.  In so doing, the court played the role of art critic, and 
added a criterion to the legal definition of a parody: “the copied work 
must be, at least in part, an object of the parody, otherwise there 
would be no need to conjure up the original work.”94  Koons’s “String 
of Puppies” may have commented on a materialistic society, the court 
conceded, but there was no discernable parody of “Puppies” itself to 
be found within it. 
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Whether the court was ever prepared to evaluate Koons’s art in a 
light favorable to the artist — i.e., to give the artist the benefit of the 
doubt when he claimed his aim was to spoof — is doubtful.  The open-
ing paragraph of the decision suggests the court was not eager to play 
art critic, and would instead view the case through a more populist 
lens:   
The key to this copyright infringement suit, brought by a plaintiff 
photographer against a defendant sculptor and the gallery 
representing him, is defendants’ borrowing of plaintiff’s expres-
sion of a typical American scene — a smiling husband and wife 
holding a litter of charming puppies. The copying was so delibe-
rate as to suggest that defendants resolved so long as they were 
significant players in the art business, and the copies they pro-
duced bettered the price of the copied work by a thousand to 
one, their piracy of a less well-known artist’s work would escape 
being sullied by an accusation of plagiarism.95 
The judge seemed primed to turn Holmes’s admonition against 
artistic elitism on its head, instead aiming his derision at high, rather 
than low, art.  Indeed, the ruling, which affirmed the lower court’s 
issuance of an injunction against further manufacture, sale, or display 
of “String of Puppies,”96 decisively rejected Koons’s fair use defense:  
“[T]here is simply nothing in the record to support a view that Koons 
produced ‘String of Puppies’ for anything other than sale as high-
priced art.  Hence, the likelihood of future harm to Rogers’ photo-
graph is presumed, and plaintiff's market for his work has been preju-
diced.”97 
B. 2 Live Crew, Pretty Woman, and Parody as Transformation 
A few years after Koons lost his court battle, parody was sanc-
tioned by the high court as a “transformative” fair use, in a decision 
whose logic derived largely from a highly influential article about fair 
use by Pierre N. Leval,98 then a judge on the U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of New York.99  In the seminal case Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,100 the Supreme Court held that rap group 2 
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Live Crew’s parody of Roy Orbison’s Oh, Pretty Woman was a lawful 
form of commentary on the original.  
While the district court had allowed this fair use defense prof-
fered by 2 Live Crew, the Sixth Circuit, in overturning the decision, 
signaled the long shadow of the Sony dicta’s commercial considera-
tions on fair use deliberations.  (Indeed, a recent history of fair use 
decisions supports the idea that, like a pendulum, courts over time 
swing back and forth between the first and fourth factors; sometimes 
the purpose and character of the use is ascendant, while at other times 
the market impact is the key determination.)101  Under the Sixth Cir-
cuit’s reasoning, “[i]f sold for money, [a secondary work] will be 
deemed commercial and presumptively unfair . . . the first factor not 
only may but must be resolved against fair use where the use is com-
mercial.”102   
While the first fair use factor, purpose and character of the use, 
has an economic dimension (insofar as the statute asks whether the 
use is commercial or noncommercial, as the Sony court pointed out), 
in 1994 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to Campbell’s appeal 
and took the opportunity to amplify this “content” factor.  In its deci-
sion, the Campbell Court betrayed the influence of Judge Leval’s ar-
ticle and marked a return to Justice Story’s original fair use formula-
tion: 
The central purpose of this investigation is to see, in Justice Sto-
ry’s words, whether the new work merely “supercedes the ob-
jects” of the original creation, or instead adds something new, 
with a further purpose or different character, altering the first 
with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other 
words, whether and to what extent the new work is “transforma-
tive.”103 
The Court decided, for the first time,104 that parody could be con-
sidered fair use, even where it was a commercial one:  “[P]arody has 
an obvious claim to transformative value . . . . [T]he heart of any pa-
rodist’s claim to quote from existing material, is the use of some ele-
ments of a prior author’s composition to create a new one that, at 
least in part, comments on that author’s works.”105  Having found 
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Campbell’s composition sufficiently parodic, however, the Court de-
clined to assess its merits:  
[W]e will not take the further step of evaluating its quality.  The 
threshold question when fair use is raised in defense of parody is 
whether a parodic character may reasonably be perceived.  
Whether, going beyond that, parody is in good taste or bad does 
not and should not matter to fair use.  As Justice Holmes ex-
plained, “[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons 
trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of 
the worth of [a work of art], outside of the narrowest and most 
obvious limits.”106   
The Court quoted Holmes’s opinion in Bleistein v. Donaldson Li-
thographic Co.107  Were judges to assess artistic merit, Holmes had 
written, “copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed to a 
public less educated than the judge.  Yet if they command the interest 
of any public, they have a commercial value; it would be bold to say 
that they have not an aesthetic and educational value — and the taste 
of any public is not to be treated with contempt.”108  
C. The Wind Done Gone: Defining, Refining “Parody” 
In 2001, author Alice Randall completed The Wind Done Gone, a 
retelling of Margaret Mitchell’s Civil War epic Gone With the Wind 
from the perspective of a slave on Scarlett O’Hara’s plantation.  The 
owners of the copyright in Gone With the Wind, the Mitchell Trust, 
sued in district court in Atlanta to enjoin publication of Randall’s 
book.  In a declaration filed with the district court, Randall stated that 
her purpose in writing the book was to create “a literary parody . . . 
that stood in ironic relationship to the [original] . . . [to] turn Gone 
With the Wind inside out and skewer that work’s profound deficiencies 
and distortions,”109 particularly its use of racial stereotypes.  Publisher 
Houghton Mifflin argued that, as a parody, The Wind Done Gone fell 
within the fair use exception, but the district court disagreed, granting 
the Trust’s motion for a preliminary injunction.110    
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The lower court allowed that The Wind Done Gone was a trans-
formative parody, but found it insufficiently transformative to over-
come the Mitchell Trust’s derivative rights in Gone With the Wind, 
which would enfold any sequel rights.  The court found The Wind 
Done Gone to be composed primarily of the original, with few addi-
tions or changes, and therefore found Randall’s to be a superseding 
use that merely fulfilled demand for the original.111   
On appeal, however, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the injunction.  
The court cited the importance of a “free flow of ideas,”112 and found 
the injunction to be “at odds with the shared principles of the First 
Amendment and the copyright law, acting as a prior restraint on 
speech.”113  Relying heavily on the jurisprudence of Campbell, includ-
ing the notion “that courts should not judge the quality of the work or 
the success of the attempted humor in discerning its parodic charac-
ter,” the court noted that decision’s bifurcated definition of parody:  
“The Supreme Court’s definition of parody in Campbell, however, is 
somewhat vague.  On the one hand, the Court suggests that the aim of 
parody is ‘comic effect or ridicule,’ but it then proceeds to discuss pa-
rody more expansively in terms of its ‘commentary’ on the original.”114   
Importantly, the Eleventh Circuit decided to take the broad view 
of parody, defining it as a work whose “aim is to comment upon or 
criticize a prior work by appropriating elements of the original in 
creating a new artistic, as opposed to scholarly or journalistic, 
work.”115  The court placed particular emphasis on the need to avoid 
subjective inquiries, noting that both plaintiff and defendant had at-
tempted to sway the court with critiques of Randall’s humor.  “The 
benefit of our approach to ‘parody,’ which requires no assessment of 
whether or not a work is humorous, is apparent from the arguments 
made by the parties in this case. . . . Under our approach, we may . . . 
simply bypass what would always be a wholly subjective inquiry.”116   
The court’s analysis found The Wind Done Gone to be principally 
a work of criticism whose objective was to lampoon and refute the 
racist and romanticized antebellum South depicted by Mitchell.   
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It is clear within the first fifty pages . . . that Randall’s work flips 
Gone With the Wind’s traditional race roles, portrays powerful 
whites as stupid or feckless, and generally sets out to demystify 
Gone With the Wind and strip the romanticism from Mitchell’s 
specific account of this period of our history.  Approximately the 
last half of The Wind Done Gone tells a completely new story 
that, although involving characters based on Gone With the Wind 
characters, features plot elements found nowhere within the cov-
ers of Gone With the Wind.117 
While the court spent the bulk of its fair use analysis on the pur-
pose and character of use test, it also found it unlikely that Randall’s 
work would act as a market substitute or harm Gone With the Wind’s 
derivative uses in any way. 
The importance of the SunTrust decision lies in the Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s embrace of the Campbell court’s broad definition of parody.  
The court’s definition of parody sets objective parameters, and, im-
portantly, disavowed literary criticism; one commentator finds the 
court’s definition of parody the rightful heir to the standards first es-
poused in Campbell.118  To have ruled otherwise would have placed 
the fair use analysis within the narrow and subjective constraints of 
evaluating the work’s comedic success.   
Instead, as the court recognized, the essential inquiry is whether, 
using parody as its vehicle, a later work comments on or criticizes the 
original upon which it is based.  This, the court seems to say, is the 
core definition of parody, and it is crucial that “the definition of paro-
dy — against which the theme, language, purpose, and style of disputed 
works are to be measured — have some objective content because the 
definitions of these elements of writing are difficult to state with pre-
cision, especially for those trained in law rather than literature.”119   
The approach reinforces the essential test in Justice Story’s origi-
nal formulation of fair use a century and a half ago: whether a later 
work is intellectually fresh, or a mere cut-and-paste job.  The true in-
quiry, under fair use’s first factor, is “whether the work supplants the 
original, or whether it transforms it into a new work.”120  In one sense, 
the case brings fair use full circle; in another sense, it represents a 
pushing back against the ever-expanding protections of copyright.  
Whether The Wind Done Gone is “destined to influence Fair Use and 
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parody litigation, particularly in the field of literature,” as one com-
mentator has contended,121 remains to be seen. 
D. Blanch: The Koons Comeback 
A 2006 case also involving Koons, tried by the same court, sug-
gests a growing judicial acceptance of transformative fair use.  In 
Blanch v. Koons,122 a fashion photographer sued the artist for copy-
right infringement after Koons incorporated one of her images, a de-
piction of a pair of legs called Silk Sandals, into a painting called Nia-
gara.  Acknowledging that the court had “declined to find a transfor-
mative use when the defendant has done no more than find a new way 
to exploit the creative virtues of the original work,”123 the court went 
on to confirm the transformative qualities of Koons’s work:   
The sharply different objectives that Koons had in using, and 
Blanch had in creating, ‘Silk Sandals’ confirms the transforma-
tive nature of the use. . . . When, as here, the copyrighted work is 
used as ‘raw material,’ in the furtherance of distinct creative or 
communicative objectives, the use is transformative.124   
The court went on to note that a finding of substantial transfor-
mation reduced the significance of the other three statutory fair use 
factors.125 
Importantly, the court also appeared to broaden the constraining 
distinction between parody (lawful fair use) and satire (unlawful fair 
use) that the Supreme Court had delineated in Campbell.  The Camp-
bell court had noted that a parody depended on use of the original 
because the original was its subject, and thus had to be recognized as 
such; satire, it held, was something else, which “stood on its own.”126  
In Blanch, however, the court suggests satire that has its object 
beyond the employed copyrighted matter can still claim fair use:  
“Koons’s use of a slick fashion photograph enables him to satirize life 
as it appears when we see it through the prism of slick fashion photo-
graphy.”127  The court’s choice to recognize Niagara as satire, rather 
than parody, marks a significant shift.   
If anything has changed since the court last ruled on Koons’s art, 
it seems to be not the art itself, but rather the court’s attitude toward 
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transformative uses.  Koons’s aim in Niagara, after all — to provide 
“commentary on the social and aesthetic consequences of mass me-
dia”128 — was not so different from what his goal had been in the 
“String of Puppies” case: signaling his belief that “the mass produc-
tion of commodities and media images has caused a deterioration in 
the quality of society.”129  Peter Jaszi has written that the Blanch deci-
sion suggests that, today, “transformativeness figures as a kind of me-
taconsideration arching over the fair use analysis.”130 
E. Gaylord: Transformation by the Postal Service 
In 2002, the United States Postal Service (USPS) decided to issue 
a thirty-seven-cent postage stamp commemorating the fiftieth anni-
versary of the armistice of the Korean War.  The stamp featured a 
photograph by John Alli of stainless steel soldier sculptures, called 
“The Column,” that are part of the Korean War Veterans Memorial 
located on the national mall in Washington, D.C.  Frank C. Gaylord 
II, the World War II veteran who created the sculpture, sued the 
USPS in Federal Claims Court, alleging that the stamp infringed his 
exclusive copyright in the sculpture and seeking a royalty of ten per-
cent on the net sales of the commemorative stamp and related mer-
chandise.131 
The court rejected out of hand the USPS’s claim that the sculp-
ture itself was a joint work, and that, because it was commissioned by 
the government, its copyright was also at least partially owned by the 
government.132  But it went on to weigh the agency’s claim of fair use, 
finding it to be transformative: 
[T]hrough his photographic talents, [Alli] transformed this ex-
pression and message, creating a surrealistic environment with 
snow and subdued lighting where the viewer is left unsure 
whether he is viewing a photograph of statues or actual human 
beings. . . . Alli’s efforts resulted in a work that has a new and dif-
ferent character than “The Column” and is thus a transformative 
work . . . [and] the Postal Service further transformed the charac-
ter and expression of “The Column” when creating the Stamp.133 
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While the court went on to analyze the stamp in the context of 
the other fair use factors, including the stamp’s impact on the poten-
tial market for sculptor’s market in similar works,134 it was clear that it 
was transformation — as employed by photographer and Postal Service 
alike, and rhapsodized by Judge Thomas C. Wheeler — that carried the 
day. 
F. The Salinger Court Takes Literary Criticism to New Judicial 
Heights 
J.D. Salinger published Catcher in the Rye in 1951, and in the 
half-century since, the iconic novel and its reclusive author have been 
the subject of widespread admiration and fascination.  While original-
ly published for adults, the novel became a classic text in high schools 
everywhere, although it was frequently banned (and still is, from time 
to time).135  Its protagonist, Holden Caulfield, became the prototype 
for disaffected youth of the post-war era.  “Most critics who looked at 
The Catcher in the Rye at the time of its publication thought that its 
language was a true and authentic rendering of teenage colloquial 
speech.”136  More than 35 million copies of the book have been sold, 
and Catcher is estimated to rank as one of the tenth or fifteenth most 
commonly read novels in American classrooms.137  In 2005, Time mag-
azine named the book one of the 100 best English-language novels 
published since 1923.138 
The recent death of J.D. Salinger highlighted the extent to which 
the author’s cultural profile was at odds with that of his antihero:  “Sa-
linger . . . turned his back on success and adulation, becoming the 
Garbo of letters, famous for not wanting to be famous.”139  As Salin-
ger’s public persona waned, that of his creation waxed, and in the 
half-century after the book was published, the author all but disap-
peared from public view.  This was by choice:  The words “reclusive 
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author” can almost always be found appended to the name “J.D. Sa-
linger,”140 and the novelist vigorously defended his privacy.  Salinger’s 
fame, the iconic status of his most beloved work, and his near-hermit 
like existence and protection of his privacy have combined over the 
past two-and-a-half decades to create a sort of perfect storm of copy-
right case law in the area of fair use.141  
In 2009, Salinger’s attorneys, armed with copyright infringement 
claims, sought a preliminary injunction against Swedish author Fre-
drik Colting, who had written a sort-of sequel to Catcher in the Rye 
called 60 Years Later: Coming Through the Rye.142  Writing under the 
dubious pen name J.D. California, the author’s main character, “Mr. 
C,” clearly an aged Holden Caulfield, escapes from a retirement home 
and embarks on a series of adventures that roughly parallel the plot of 
Catcher in the Rye.  The novel’s later chapters depict the aged Caul-
field confronting his creator, Salinger himself.  On July 1, 2009, the 
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York — the same 
court that had found fair use grounds to justify Ian Hamilton’s bio-
graphical use of Salinger’s letters in 1986 — granted Salinger a prelimi-
nary injunction against the publication of Colting’s book.   
Leaning heavily on Campbell and, to a lesser extent, the SunTrust 
decision, the district court began its fair use inquiry by determining 
whether the new book’s “parodic character may reasonably be per-
ceived.”143  It quickly found the answer to be no:  “[T]he Court finds 
such contentions to be post-hoc rationalizations employed through 
vague generalizations about the alleged naivete of the original, rather 
than reasonably perceivable parody.”144  60 Years Later was no parody, 
the court held, because it “contains no reasonably discernable re-
joinder or specific criticism of any character or theme of Catcher.”145  
While labels are not dispositive,146 Colting hadn’t done himself any 
favors with his jacket copy, of which the court took note:  “Until the 
present lawsuit was filed, Defendants made no indication that 60 Years 
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was in any way a parody . . . . Quite to the contrary, the original jacket 
of 60 Years states that it is ‘. . . a marvelous sequel to one of our most 
beloved classics.’”147 
The opinion reveals just how fine a line a court must navigate be-
tween “discerning parody” (a potentially fair form of transformation) 
and employing literary criticism.  While judges have long admonished 
each other against the latter, Colting makes it apparent how difficult it 
may be in practice to avoid literary critique in fair use deliberations.  
For example, in her analysis, District Judge Deborah Batts examined 
themes common to Salinger’s original and Colting’s derivative work, 
basing her estimation that the latter lacked transformative value on 
that very commonality.  Colting’s claims to augment the portrait of 
Caulfield in Catcher by showing the effects of the character’s uncom-
promising world view, the judge writes, were unpersuasive because 
those effects were already thoroughly depicted and apparent in Salin-
ger’s own narrative.  “It is hardly parodic to repeat that same exercise 
in contrast, just because society and the characters have aged.”148  As a 
later amicus brief put it, “The District Court . . . applied an unduly 
restrictive fair use standard by acting as a literary critic.”149 
Judge Batts seems to say that, for a work to be transformative, 
characters must evolve in order to create new themes and facilitate 
new meaning.  By this logic, Colting’s gambit — that Caulfield’s cha-
racter would not change over the years, and that he would therefore 
come to seem, to readers who once admired him, more pathetic than 
endearing — was doomed to failure.  “[T]o the extent Colting . . . is 
attempting to accentuate how Holden’s emotional growth would ulti-
mately be stunted by his unwillingness to compromise his principles or 
engage with ‘the phonies,’ they were again simply rehashing one of 
the critical extant themes of Catcher.”150  The statement is illustrative 
of the perils of judge-as-critic:  Judge Batts has substituted her judg-
ment — that to depict Holden Caulfield as an insufficiently developed 
character is an act of artistic expression unworthy of fair use protec-
tion — for that of the author-defendant, as well as his potential read-
ers.   
Colting appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 
arguing several grounds on which the injunction should be vacated, 
including that the order constituted unlawful prior restraint, and that 
                                                                                                                           
 147 Id. at 260 n.3. 
 148 Id. at 259. 
 149 Brief of Amici Curiae American Library Association et al. at 4, Salinger v. Colting, 607 
F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 09-2878-cv), 2009 WL 6865321. 
 150 See Posting of Peter Friedman to Geniocity,  
http://blogs.geniocity.com/friedman/tag/coming-through-the-rye (July 9, 2009).  
148 FIU Law Review [6:123 
the court had failed to apply the controlling preliminary injunction 
standards.151  These require the plaintiff to establish (1) that he is like-
ly to succeed on the merits, (2) that he is likely to suffer irreparable 
harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) that the balance of equi-
ties tips in his favor, and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest.  
On April 30, 2010, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit re-
manded the case, agreeing that the lower court had applied incorrect 
preliminary injunction standards.  But on the first element, the like-
lihood of success on the merits, the court of appeals stacked the deck, 
holding that there was “not clear error” in the district court’s rejection 
of the fair use defense.152  “It may be that a court can find that the fair 
use factor favors a defendant even when the defendant and his work 
lack a transformative purpose,” the court posited, before setting that 
question aside.153 
In death, Salinger remains a figure of public fascination, but pop-
ular sentiment runs against his lawsuit.  One writer lamented:  “Hol-
den remains in a specimen jar in schoolbook closets across the country 
— a shameful fate.”154  In its Week in Review section shortly after the 
decision, The New York Times opined: 
The books that get re-written and re-imagined are beloved. We 
don’t want them ever to be over. We pay them the great compli-
ment of imagining they’re almost real: that there must be more to 
the story, and that characters we know so well . . . must have 
more to their lives.155 
The Times — along with the Associated Press and Gannett News-
papers — took a more strident approach in an amicus brief, filed with 
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in support of vacating 
the injunction against Colting’s book.156  “The only harm” that might 
stem from allowing publication of 60 Years Later, the brief stated, 
“appears to be to the pride of a reclusive author in not having his de-
sires fulfilled.”157  
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III.  THE FUTURE OF FAIR USE  
As a 2008 symposium at Columbia University concluded, “Fair 
use reform is in the air.”158  A resulting law review article offered a 
simple proposal for reform; there are many.  As Jed Rubenfeld noted 
in 2002, “Copyright law is today in the same position, vis a vis the 
First Amendment, as libel was before New York Times v. Sullivan.”159  
Rubenfeld’s point was that the courts must work to limit the reach of 
copyright law in the interest of artistic freedom, as they did libel law 
in the seminal press freedom case.  As one lay critic of copyright law 
put it: 
Viewed up close, copyright . . . looks like a constantly expanding 
government program run for the benefit of a noisy, well-
organized interest group — like Superfund, say, or dairy subsidies, 
except that the benefits go not to endangered homeowners or 
hard-working farmers but to the likes of Barbra Streisand and 
Eminem. . . . Copyright is a trial lawyer’s dream — a regulatory 
program enforced by private lawsuits where the plaintiffs have 
all the advantages, from injury-free damage awards to liability 
doctrines that extract damages from anyone who was in the 
neighborhood when an infringement occurred.160 
A. Fixing Fair Use 
What most reform proposals have in common is the aim of limit-
ing copyright’s scope by expanding the protections of fair use.  Gide-
on Parchomovsky and Kevin Goldman propose the adoption of legal 
fair use “safe harbors,” which would allow the lesser of fifteen percent 
or 300 words copied from any work greater than 100 words in the case 
of literary works, ten percent or ten seconds in the case of sound re-
cordings.161  Wendy Gordon long ago proposed a “market failure” 
approach that would find fair use where (1) there is market failure; (2) 
a transfer of copyright (or a finding of fair use) is socially desirable; 
and (3) that use would not cause substantial injury.162  (The problem 
with the approach, in a case such as Salinger’s, is that it doesn’t recog-
nize market failure as a result of an author’s “non-dissemination mo-
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tive.”)163  Still other ideas posit the creation of fair use tribunals with 
judges capable of limiting liability and issuing no-action letters.164   
A common thread among fair use reform proposals is far simpler:  
Fix the existing four-part statutory test, perhaps by reducing that test 
to parts one and four: nature of use and economic impact.  Indeed, a 
statistical analysis of fair use decisions of the last three decades sug-
gests that courts are already effectively doing so; the other two factors 
rarely have an impact on the outcome of fair use decisions.165  In fact, 
critics say, the more factors there are, the more difficult it becomes to 
determine which factors are important.166  Reducing the test to these 
factors boils fair use down to its essential question:  Would the pro-
posed use increase social value more than it diminishes it?167   
Another proposal calls for separating the transformation “test” 
from fair use determinations, resulting in a second affirmative defense 
to copyright infringement claims.  John Tehranian suggests fair use as 
the first line of defense, because it immunizes defendants from liabili-
ty; as a next line of defense, however, a finding of “transformative 
use” would result in intermediate liability.  The secondary author-
defendant would be required to register her work as a transformative 
use — including parody, satire, sampling, and other forms of appropria-
tion art — with the Copyright Office, and a judicial finding of trans-
formative use would exempt that author from damages or injunctive 
relief.  Instead, the “original author of the copyrighted work and the 
transformative user of that work would evenly divide all profits result-
ing from the commercial exploitation” of the later work.168  As Tehra-
nian acknowledges, however, creating a distinct, statutory “transfor-
mative use” defense would require revisiting the derivative right, be-
cause the two concepts are frequently incompatible.169 
B. Enjoining the Injunction 
Another common thread in the fair use debate is an increasing 
aversion to preliminary injunctions as remedies in some kinds of cop-
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yright infringement suits.  Injunctive relief has largely become the 
default remedy, as illustrated by the SunTrust and Colting cases and 
others where defendants have engaged in creative adaptation rather 
than literal copying.170  Indeed, the injunction was once disfavored in 
copyright jurisprudence.171  It was eschewed in Abend, where the court 
stated:  “[T]here may be a strong public interest in the publication of 
the secondary work [and] the copyright owner's interest may be ade-
quately protected by an award of damages for whatever infringement 
is found.”172  The Supreme Court also admonished against this reliance 
on injunctive relief, in dicta, in Campbell:   
Because the fair use enquiry often requires close questions of 
judgment as to the extent of permissible borrowing in cases in-
volving parodies (or other critical works), courts may also wish to 
bear in mind that the goals of the copyright law . . . are not al-
ways best served by automatically granting injunctive relief when 
parodists are found to have gone beyond the bounds of fair use.173  
Judge Leval, who now sits on the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit, where the Colting case was decided, has propounded 
the idea that, if a secondary work is derivative, the court should not 
issue an injunction.  Instead, an “action for profit allocation” may be 
the solution, which sounds a lot like Tehranian’s intermediate liability 
scheme.  Disparaging the injunction as an overly automatic remedy in 
copyright cases, especially considering that prior restraint represents 
such an affront to First Amendment principles, Leval argues the law 
should distinguish between piracy and reasonable contentions of fair 
use.174  Transformation, it has been argued, represents one such rea-
sonable contention:   
Some view transformation as no wrong at all — they believe that 
our law, as the framers penned it, should not protect derivative 
rights at all. . . . [I]t seems plain that whatever wrong is involved 
is fundamentally different from the wrong of direct piracy.  Yet 
copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same way.  
I can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my 
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book.  I can go to court and get an injunction against your trans-
formative use of my book.175 
In 2006, the Supreme Court in eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C. 
admonished courts for being too quick to provide injunctions in pa-
tent cases, and said that the same rules of equity applied in the copy-
right context as well.176  The Court vacated a court of appeals decision 
granting injunctive relief in a patent dispute after the lower court arti-
culated a “’general rule,’ unique to patent disputes, that a permanent 
injunction will issue once infringement and validity have been ad-
judged.”177  In other words, irreparable harm is no longer presumed in 
copyright cases, but rather must be proven.  “Like the Patent Act, the 
Copyright Act provides that courts ‘may’ grant injunctive relief on 
such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringe-
ment of a copyright.’ . . . [T]his Court has consistently rejected invita-
tions to replace traditional equitable considerations with a rule that an 
injunction automatically follows a determination that a copyright has 
been infringed.”178 
Perhaps following this edict, the Southern District of New York 
in 2008 denied an injunction to Yoko Ono Lennon when she sued to 
prohibit further distribution of a film that used fifteen seconds of John 
Lennon’s “Imagine” without her permission.179  “Defendants’ use of 
‘Imagine’ is transformative because their purpose is to criticize the 
song’s message,” the court stated, adding that “plaintiffs have not 
shown that the balance of hardships decidedly favors them.”180 
C. Narrowing the Derivative Right 
Another approach to restoring fair use balance is a proposal to 
constrain the wide-reaching derivative right.  Glynn Lunney has dis-
mantled the natural rights argument for the derivative right.181  Taking 
an economics-based approach, Lunney compares the natural rights 
arguments involving authorship to a theoretically analogous right in 
other forms of property, noting, “Any number of people labor to pro-
duce products which then become inputs for someone else’s labor.”182  
If every end product required a license from someone in that chain of 
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production, then economic activity would be choked.  In other words, 
do authors owe a portion of their profits to the typewriter or word-
processing software makers who were part of their process?  If not, 
the theory goes, derivative authors should not owe original creators, 
either. 
Another commentator has suggested that the broad protections 
afforded by the derivative right are also inconsistent with its economic 
incentive rationale.  Stewart Sterk has said that for the economic in-
centives argument to hold sway, two conditions must be present:  
First, the return of investment on the original work is so small as to 
call into question the rationality of its production in the first place.  
And second, the return of investment on the derivative must be suffi-
ciently large to overcome both the low return on the original and the 
subsequent cost of producing the derivative.183  As Sterk points out, 
the rare scenario most likely to produce such conditions is the licens-
ing of movie rights, and the likelihood of any first author realizing 
such a windfall is “infinitesimally small.”184 
It is true that eliminating the exclusive derivative right would un-
dermine the incentive that copyright provides for the creation of the 
original work,185 particularly where an adaptation maintains the essen-
tial content of the original work in the same or another form, as in a 
translation.  Additionally, without a derivative right, authors would be 
unlikely to create derivative works, such as movies, that require time 
to produce and significant capital investment, since they could not be 
assured of coming to market first. 
But the scope of the derivative right, Lunney argues, should be 
akin to the original scope of the reproduction right:  Copyright law 
under the reproduction right should prohibit exact duplication; copy-
right law under the derivative right should prohibit exact derivative 
works that merely recast a copyrighted work in a new language or 
medium.186  Under this standard, an unauthorized film or stage adapta-
tion infringes; an unauthorized sequel does not.  “[A]ny significant 
transformation of or variation from the underlying work should prec-
lude a finding of infringement even if the underlying work remains 
recognizable.”187 
This effective elimination of the derivative right would come 
closest to restoring to authors the freedoms they once had to create 
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adaptations and translations of existing works, a freedom they held 
until the late nineteenth century. 
IV.  TOWARD A TRANSFORMATION DOCTRINE 
What, then, is transformation?  Is it compatible with the deriva-
tive right?  While the concept of transformative use is as elusive as 
that of fair use, courts have drawn lines.  There are essentially two 
contexts for transformative use decisions: technical, and artistic.  In 
cases ranging from the VCR to the DVR, courts have defined the pa-
rameters of technical fair use, generally elevating the rights of con-
sumers to access new technologies and information over the concerns 
of the content companies fighting the adoption of those technologies.   
In this section, I focus on the alternative line of cases that deals 
with transformation in an artistic context.  Additionally, I examine the 
1991 Supreme Court copyright decision Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural 
Telephone Service Co., Inc.,188 in an effort to extract principles that 
might be applied to the concept of transformation.  Together, this 
body of case law may point the way toward the parameters of defens-
ible transformative uses.  Next, I explore the tangle of remedies found 
both in copyright jurisprudence and commentary in order to propose 
a workable scheme of equitable remedies in the transformation con-
text.  And lastly, I attempt to justify this approach within the larger 
framework of the First Amendment considerations that should under-
lie copyright infringement decisions where arguable transformative 
uses are in play. 
A. Defining Transformation 
The first step in carving out a transformation doctrine is defining 
transformation itself.  A distillation of the case law provides a surpri-
singly workable definition of a transformative fair use.  Such uses tend 
to fall into two categories: those that critique the original on which 
they are based, and those that take the underlying work in a new di-
rection. 
The first use is fairly simple to spot.  Its context has long included 
commentary, but beginning with Campbell, parody and, arguably, 
satire may also justify this kind of transformative use, whose aim may 
be “to comment upon or criticize a prior work by appropriating ele-
ments of the original in creating a new artistic . . . work.”189  
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The second transformative use can be more perplexing to eva-
luate, as evidenced by the courts in Rogers and Salinger.  Essentially it 
takes an original creation, and “adds something new, with a further 
purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, 
meaning, or message.”190  This kind of transformation results in “a 
work that has a new and different character”191 from the original upon 
which it is based.  If it “adds value to the original . . . [through] the 
creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and under-
standings,”192 if a secondary author has “sharply different objectives” 
for which she uses the copyrighted work “as ‘raw material,’ in the fur-
therance of distinct creative or communicative objectives,” that use is 
transformative,193 and therefore is the kind of expression that is meant 
to be protected by fair use. 
These cases might be distilled into two relatively simple factors.  
Transformation uses a copyrighted work as raw material either 1) to 
comment upon or criticize the prior work, or 2) in the furtherance of 
distinct creative or communicative objectives. 
The cases are also relatively clear about what isn’t transforma-
tion.  In these situations, it is typically the derivative right that is im-
plicated, and such cases should be resolved in favor of the copyright 
holder.  A pair of New York cases, in which the publication of spin-off 
books based on successful books and films was enjoined,194 show that a 
secondary work cannot merely reproduce the essence of the original, 
in a different format, without adding anything of substance to it.  This 
reading is also compatible with Campbell, where the secondary, rap 
version of Pretty Woman added a derisive tone and grittier lyrics to 
the original.  And it even comports with Rogers v. Koons:  Although 
the Rogers court emphasized that the copied work must be, at least in 
part, an object of the parody, another problem for the secondary work 
was that it merely reproduced the original, exactly, in a different me-
dium.195 
Viewed in this light, Salinger poses perhaps the most difficult 
case of artistic transformation in fair use case law to date.  Each of the 
questions involved in the transformation inquiry depends, to a great 
extent, on a literary analysis of 60 Years Later.  Must its aim be “to 
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comment upon or criticize”196 Catcher in the Rye, or must it merely 
result in someone’s idea of commentary or criticism?  The Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit seemed to suggest that the question — 
whether there must be an intent element in the Transformation Test — 
remains an open one.  Another question remains, because of the per-
plexing thematic character (whether intended or merely discernable) 
of the would-be sequel:  To what extent must that result have “a new 
and different character”197 than Salinger’s novel if the point of that 
commentary is to explore stasis?  The district court found that Colt-
ing’s sequel “contains no reasonably discernable rejoinder or specific 
criticism of any character or theme of Catcher,” but this may be un-
derstandable if one considers that the theme hasn’t changed: its con-
text has.  The district court still has a chance, on remand, to decide 
such questions. 
Where there is a transformative use that creates something fresh 
out of the old parts of the original (rather than commenting on that 
original), courts should consider turning to the broad precepts of 
Feist198 for guidance on distinguishing a transformative use from a 
merely derivative one.  In Feist, a telephone utility sued a publisher 
that used the utility’s listings in its own version of a telephone directo-
ry.  The Court denied relief, finding that the names, addresses, and 
phone numbers were uncopyrightable facts that the utility had not 
selected or arranged in a sufficiently original manner to be eligible for 
a copyright.  While the Court based its decision not on fair use, but 
rather on the idea/expression dichotomy — a doctrine that says ideas 
are not copyrightable, only their individualized expressions are — its 
emphasis on, and definition of, originality is instructive.  The reason 
facts are not copyrightable, the Court explained, is that “the sine qua 
non of copyright is originality. . . . Original, as the term is used in cop-
yright, means only that the work was independently created by the 
author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses 
at least some minimal degree of creativity.”199   
In a sense, the creator of a transformative work is, ipso facto, vy-
ing not merely to distinguish her work from a derivative one, but to 
establish her own work as copyrightable.  A judicial determination is 
required, in such a contest, in order to first distinguish the new work 
from the prior work.  Feist’s “modicum of originality” is therefore an 
appropriate benchmark in the context of adjudging a transformative 
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use; just as originality is the sine qua non of copyright protection, so 
too should it be the basis of transformative uses.   
Within the framework of Feist, then, the derivative right still 
serves to protect original works, but the scope of that protection nar-
rows to what is essentially a corollary to the reproduction right.  A 
secondary work that merely reproduces the original in a new format 
(such as a film based on a book) is derivative and no more; certainly, a 
change of format is not a transformative act.  Similarly, under the 
transformation/derivative analysis, the original author’s essential crea-
tions — characters, situations, and, importantly, themes (i.e., the build-
ing blocks of art) — are analogous to the “facts” of Feist.  They are not 
independently copyrightable by the subsequent author because, ab-
sent “new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understand-
ings,”200 they are in no way original. 
B. Making Transformation Work 
Once courts are equipped to systematically recognize transforma-
tive uses, the question becomes not whether they are to be allowed, 
but how? 
Both Tehranian’s intermediate liability proposal and Leval’s ac-
tion for profit allocation point to the same conclusion: that a legiti-
mately transformative use has undeniably benefited from the exis-
tence of an original, copyrighted work, and that some form of restitu-
tion should be made.  But profit allocation and intermediate liability 
may be difficult remedies to implement — the former because it can be 
so difficult to separate the profits resulting from the secondary crea-
tor’s efforts (as opposed to those that stem from the merits of the 
original), and the latter because it requires a similar determination, in 
addition to adding to the process the bureaucratic step of preemptive 
registration of transformative uses.  
If we consider a transformative use to be akin to a cover version 
of a recorded song, however, an alternative solution might be the im-
plementation of a compulsory statutory license fee of the kind already 
employed for music recordings.201  As that copyright provision states, 
“the privilege of making a [use] of the work . . . shall not be subject to 
protection as a derivative work under this title.”202  And as with music, 
the Copyright Royalty Judges, whose mission includes “maximiz[ing] 
the availability of creative works to the public,”203 could set the appro-
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priate rate.  By subjecting transformative uses to a compulsory license 
— or, in the event it is not paid, a judicial damage award — secondary 
authors would be freed to transform prior works without owner au-
thorization, yet they would pay a nominal sum for the privilege.  
Owners would be compensated both through their own efforts and 
those of the compulsory license. 
C. A Transformation Doctrine Can Restore Balance to the Copy-
right-First Amendment Tension 
Twenty-five years ago the Supreme Court cautioned, “[I]t should 
not be forgotten that the Framers intended copyright itself to be the 
engine of free expression.”204  Many commentators believe that rather 
than serve to propel free expression, modern copyright law has done 
more to apply the brakes.205  Fair use and idea/expression dichotomy 
are no match, they say, for large content companies armed with deriv-
ative rights; those ameliorating doctrines, once held up to forestall 
First Amendment inquiries into copyright’s potential to chill speech, 
are no longer robust enough to serve as the bulwark of free expres-
sion.   
In the end, whether a transformative use is silenced by copyright 
owners directly or through the high barriers and legal uncertainties 
erected by the copyright statutes, the resulting harm to the culture is 
the same: “transformative expression has been muted.”206  Because of 
this, judges should balance a legitimate governmental interest — the 
interest represented by the Constitutional creation of intellectual 
property rights — against the impact of that regulatory regime on the 
speech interests also protected by the Constitution.207 
An even more fundamental reason that courts should look liber-
ally at transformative uses of copyrighted content is what Jed Ruben-
feld calls “the freedom of imagination.”208  The First Amendment ex-
ists not merely to protect speech and art that we deem valuable, he 
says.  It exists to protect all citizens’ rights to exercise the freedoms of 
imagination and expression, as long as the exercise of those freedoms 
does not conflict with the rights — property rights or otherwise — of 
other citizens.  Foreclosing this “freedom of imagination” is unconsti-
tutional, Rubenfeld argues, and therefore the justifications for doing 
so should satisfy strict judicial scrutiny.   
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In the case of outright piracy, where a secondary purveyor seeks 
merely to free-ride on the copyrighted work of another, infringement 
actions and preliminary injunctions are appropriate.  Acts of trans-
formation, however, bring something new and original to the table; 
they may not be subjectively or even objectively “good,” but just as 
the Constitution protects foolish or offensive speech, so too must it 
protect futile or unsophisticated art.  “The key to a constitutional 
copyright law lies in reclaiming and narrowing the core concept of 
reproduction [and] revitalizing the distinction between derivative 
works and reproduction.”209   
The Wind Done Gone, however, may have marked a turning 
point.  For the first time, an appellate court explicitly used the First 
Amendment to limit the enforcement of an author’s copyright.210  And 
in Golan v. Gonzales,211 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
held that § 514 of the copyright statutes, enacted to grant protection 
to certain works that had already been in the public domain in order 
to bring the United States into compliance with the Berne Conven-
tion, must be subjected to First Amendment scrutiny.212  Where Salin-
ger fits on this continuum may yet be seen.  The decision has the po-
tential to be an important one in the evolution of a transformation 
doctrine. 
V.  CONCLUSION   
The rights conferred by copyright have continually expanded, 
from the duration of the monopoly to the degree of its protections.  
Even 170 years ago, in the British Parliament, copyright was seen as a 
necessary evil, and term extensions were regarded with suspicion:  
“For the sake of the good we must submit to the evil; but the evil 
ought not to last a day longer than is necessary for the purpose of se-
curing the good.”213  As copyright’s dominion has expanded, it has 
increasingly come into conflict with the Constitution’s overarching 
philosophy about its role in cultivating scientific and artistic develop-
ment.  Copyright should promote artistic and scientific progress,214 and 
not, as Justice Stevens reminded, serve as an exclusive club for the 
benefit of rights holders.215  Today the derivative and reproduction 
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rights represent a dramatic enlargement of copyright protection 
beyond its modest beginnings.216   
Fair use requires judges to line-draw between true creative labor 
and mere coattail-riding.  And as difficult as it may be for judges to 
apply the doctrine, writers and artists who seek to rely on fair use 
have the most to lose.  Copyright law too often fails to distinguish be-
tween a pirating use and a productive one:  The first is outright theft, 
the second, progress.   
As an engine of enlightened thought and expression, copyright 
law seems dangerously close to outgrowing its original purpose.  
Where a copyright no longer serves to spark the spread of knowledge 
and inspire the search for truth, but rather to protect moneyed inter-
ests, a fundamental right of expression is being denied, and the level 
of judicial scrutiny should rise accordingly.  The First Amendment 
exists to protect all citizens’ rights to exercise the freedom to imagine 
and create, and fair use remains the best vehicle for balancing incen-
tives for authors against the expression of subsequent authors. 
But it needs to be strengthened.  This can be accomplished by re-
sisting the reflex of injunctions in the cases where outright piracy is 
not implicated, and by allowing the First Amendment to play a part in 
infringement determinations.  Courts should also tighten the grip on 
the derivative right, which should not be read to foreclose works that 
involve creative adaptation rather than literal copying.  Most elusive, 
though perhaps most helpful, would be to cement the judicial under-
standing of the transformative use through its own separate, vigorous 
doctrine. 
All great societies and cultures were built on those that came be-
fore:  “The Romans copied the Greeks; Shakespeare copied the works 
of others with wild abandon and without attribution.”217  William 
Fisher made the same point more than twenty years ago, long before 
the ability to transform pre-existing artistic works had been spread to 
the masses thanks to the Internet and digital technologies: 
Active interaction with one’s cultural environment is good for 
the soul.  A person living the good life would be a creator, not 
just a consumer, of works of the intellect. . . . [Walt] Whitman’s 
contention that, to realize the promise of democracy, to create 
and sustain a society in which people flourish, we must cultivate a 
new kind of ‘character’ — one not only more ‘attentive,’ more ca-
pable of appreciating the texture of the surface of life, but also 
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more energetic, more actively engaged in the production and 
transformation of ‘Culture’—is even more applicable to the Unit-
ed States of the 1980’s than it was to the United States of the 
1860’s.218 
“What does that have to do with the fair use doctrine?” Fisher 
asked.  “It suggests that uses of copyrighted material that either con-
stitute or facilitate creative engagement with intellectual products 
should be preferred to uses that neither constitute nor foster such en-
gagement.”219  Fisher argued that a society that wishes to nurture the 
self-expression and self-realization of its citizens requires: 
a rich artistic tradition [and] the richer it is in the raw materials 
of representation, metaphor, and allusion —  the more opportuni-
ties for creativity and subtlety in communication and thought it 
affords the members of the culture.  The complexity and reson-
ance of the culture’s language in large part depends . . . upon the 
quality of its “vocabulary of art.” . . . [Government’s job is to] 
protect the culture’s language as a whole and its artistic vocabu-
lary in particular “from structural debasement or decay” — both 
by preserving and making accessible to the public “a rich stock of 
illustrative and comparative collections” of art and by fostering a 
tradition of artistic innovation.220 
This is particularly true in an age in which pastiche, remix, and 
mash-up represent a new democraticization of art — as well as its fu-
ture.221  While the origins of copyright law date to a time when modern 
notions of authorship were emerging and contributing to the idea of 
property rights in creative works, the postmodern sensibility has 
created a far different cultural landscape, one in which sampling, re-
mix culture, and other forms of cultural pastiche are becoming the 
ascendant forms of expression, particularly among the young.222  Ap-
propriation art — works that take pre-existing culture as their basis — is 
devalued by copyright law’s presumption that it is derivative.  Worse, 
this stance may become untenable as digital technologies make the 
assimilation and reproduction of art increasingly accessible.  Put more 
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simply, “imagination trumps ownership on the playground, and this 
freedom should continue even on digital playgrounds.”223  This is 
where the artists of tomorrow are at play, and the playground is more 
boisterous than ever before. 
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